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A Look at the Supreme Court Justices’ Individual Biases
Toward Copyright Law: Prediction and Reflection on
the Golan v. Holder Decision
by Elizabeth F. Jackson1
I.

Introduction1

The Constitution aims “to promote the
progress of Sciences and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2
This Copyright Clause mandates a balance between two
competing interests: protecting artists’ investment in
their art, while enriching society with the dissemination
of that art.3 When Congress fails to maintain this
balance, the Supreme Court should deem the action
unconstitutional. In the 1990s, the Court capably
maintained that balance.4 In 2003, however, the Court
seemed to reverse course, tipping the balance in favor
of copyright protection in Eldred v. Ashcroft.5 And
with the Golan v. Holder decision,6 the Supreme Court
skewed the balance even further.
This article began as an exploration of the
justices’ personal biases toward copyright law in
order to predict the Golan decision. Part II details
the history of the Golan case. Part III analyzes the
justices’ previous writings and words on intellectual
property law. Part IV argues how the Supreme Court
should hold in this case. I wrote Part II–IV before the
Golan decision was handed down, and I have left these
sections intact to compare the predictions originally
made with the ultimate decision. Part V was written
after and explains how the Supreme Court ultimately
held in the Golan case and my reflections on that
decision. Unfortunately, I hypothesized correctly that
the justices would defer to Congress’s extension and
resurrection of copyright protection. In doing so, the
justices effectively foreclosed constitutional avenues
1. J.D. Candidate 2012, American University Washington
College of Law; M.A. in Literature from Florida State University;
graduated magna cum laude from Vanderbilt University.
2. US. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 1–1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.05 (2011) (indicating this
balance as the philosophical rationale of the Copyright Clause).
4. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 347
(1991) (distinguishing between a factual compilation that can be
copyrighted and the compilation’s underlying facts that cannot be
copyrighted).
5. 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the Copyright Term
Extension Act (CTEA) constitutional).
6. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
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of protecting the safeguards of the First Amendment
within the Copyright Clause: the public domain and
the fair use doctrine.
Although they both lead to the same result—
allowing others to use the work—the public domain
and the fair use doctrine are two entirely different
copyright law concepts. Public domain refers to
works without copyright protection or works whose
copyright protection has lapsed; anyone may use these
works for any purpose.7 Fair use is the lawful use of
copyrighted works based on the nature of the use, for
example, teaching, scholarship, and critique.8 Both the
public domain and fair use ensure the dissemination of
information for the public good.
The public domain and fair use also protect
individuals’ freedom of speech from copyright
legislation. In Eldred, Justice Ginsburg referred to
them as “built-in First Amendment accommodations.”9
The First Amendment protects an individual’s
freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly from
government’s interference.10 Copyright protection
takes certain works out of public use; it prevents people
from exercising their freedom of speech with these
works until that protection lapses. For example, an
individual cannot use the phrase “Mickey Mouse” on
a t-shirt until The Walt Disney Company’s copyright
expires. Copyright protection interferes with First
Amendment rights. The public domain and fair use are
the safeguards that maintain some freedom of speech
despite copyright protection.11

7. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods, 644 F.3d 584,
596 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that the public is “free to use public
domain materials in new ways”).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing illustrative fair uses
and the factors to determine which uses are fair: the purpose and
character of the use, nature of the copyrighted work, amount of the
copyrighted work used, and the degree to which the use affects the
copyrighted work’s market).
9. 537 U.S. at 190.
10. US. Const. amend. I.
11. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 190 (explaining that the ideaexpression dichotomy allows only expressions, not the ideas or
facts being expressed, to be protected and fair use allows use of
expressions for limited times).

Spring 2012

II. Background
In 1991, the Supreme Court defined the
public domain in the seminal case of Feist Publications
v. Rural Telephone Services.12 The Court held that a
telephone book, though time-consuming and difficult
to create, is not copyrightable, thereby memorializing
one of copyright law’s greatest tenets: information is
not copyrightable, though the creative expression of
that information might be.13 The Court rationalized
that facts are not original to the author and therefore
not copyrightable.14 While it is possible to acquire a
copyright in just the arrangement of those facts, there
must be a modicum of creativity in the arrangement.15
However, information, ideas, facts, and processes must
remain in the public domain.
Three years later, the Supreme Court expanded
the fair use doctrine in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.16 The Court found that 2 Live Crew’s rap parody
of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” was—despite being
a highly commercial endeavor—a fair use.17 Though
the Court still used the four factors outlined in the
Copyright Act to determine fair use,18 it emphasized
“transformativeness” above all other considerations.
Transformativeness is the degree to which the new user
repurposes the copyrighted work, such as: including
concert posters in a biographical coffee table book,19
displaying modeling photographs in a newspaper
article,20 and showing clips of an actor’s films in a
television news report.21 In Acuff-Rose, Justice Souter
explained the emphasis on transformativeness: “[T]
he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair
12. 499 U.S. at 344 (“The most fundamental axiom of
copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright his ideas or the facts
he narrates.’”(quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
13. Id.; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–101 (1879)
(holding that Selden’s expression of a system of book-keeping was
copyrightable, but the system itself was not).
14. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
15. Id. at 346.
16. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
17. Id. at 594.
18. Id. at 570-72; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (considering
purpose of the use, nature of the copyrighted work, amount of
the copyrighted work used, and effect of the copyrighted work’s
market).
19. Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,
448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
20. Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23
(1st Cir. 2000).
21. Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright.”22 In essence, any work may
be used if you can alter its purpose enough. This
supports Judge Leval’s claim, in an article written before
Acuff-Rose and the rise of transformativeness, that the
objective of copyright law is to “stimulate creativity for
public illumination.”23
Feist and Acuff-Rose defined the space of
unprotected works, where rights holders cannot prevent
users from expressing themselves. Some commentators
claim that the Court’s motivation was fear of excessive
protection and its effect on competition.24 In the
next significant copyright case to reach the Supreme
Court, however, the Court flipped sides. In 2003,
the Court heard Eldred, a constitutional challenge to
the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).25 The
CTEA extended copyright protection from the life of
the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus
seventy years, and for works for hire, from seventyfive years from creation to 120 years from creation or
ninety-five years from publication, whichever came
sooner.26 The CTEA was dubbed the “Mickey Mouse
Protection Act” because of the Walt Disney Company’s
lobbying efforts; its passage effectively froze the
protected status of Steamboat Willie and other stories
as they were once again on the verge of falling into the
public domain.27
The petitioner’s argument in Eldred was
twofold: that the expansion of copyright protection
violated the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times”
restriction and the expansion harmed the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech. In an opinion
22. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.
23. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990); see also Patricia Aufderheide & Peter
Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use 82 (2011) (connecting Judge Leval’s
article to the rise of transformativeness in Acuff-Rose and beyond).
24. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the
Groundwork for Greater First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual
Property, 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 11, 16 (2006) (hypothesizing
the Rehnquist Court’s motivation underlying intellectual property
jurisprudence).
25. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003).
26. Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–207 (2006)).
27. See Charles Kenny, How Mickey Mouse Beat the Shit Out
of Thomas Jefferson, The Animation Anomaly (June 16, 2011),
http://animationanomaly.com/2011/06/16/how-mickey-mousebeat-the-shit-out-of-thomas-jefferson/ (listing the years when
Mickey Mouse should have entered the public domain but for
congressional intervention); see also Edward C. Walterscheid,
The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in
Historical Perspective 272 (2002) (stating that Jefferson wanted
to set a definitive time period for copyright “monopolies,” thereby
precluding renewal and extensions).
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by Justice Ginsburg, the Court found the CTEA
constitutional because the Constitution only requires
copyright protection to be limited, not fixed at a
certain length of time, and Congress acted within the
authority granted to it by the Copyright Clause.28 But
Justice Ginsburg explained that the two safeguards of
the First Amendment remained in place: (1) the ideaexpression dichotomy, first delineated in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises29 and subsequently
reinforced in Feist, that “every idea, theory, and fact in a
copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public
exploitation at the moment of publication”30 and (2)
the fair use defense articulated in Acuff-Rose allows use
of a copyrighted work for a limited purpose.31
The attorney for the petitioner, Lawrence
Lessig, reflected on the day with regret, wishing that
he had stressed the harm done by delaying so many
copyrighted works from entering the public domain,
rather than relying on precedential arguments.32
Lessing’s strategy had been to focus on the danger of
Congress’s unlimited power, as the Court had done in
United States v. Lopez, and to analogize the Copyright
Clause to the Commerce Clause.33 Lessig wished he
could do it over; though, perhaps it would not matter
because he noticed the president of the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) sitting in the seats
usually reserved for the Court’s family members during
oral arguments.34
In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to Golan.35 On December 8, 1994, President Clinton
had signed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA),36 an act that purportedly brought the United
States into alignment with the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS) Agreement that the
United States signed in April of 1994. Section 514 of
28. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 187-88.
29. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding no fair use when the Nation
scooped the most salacious part of Gerald Ford’s biography).
30. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
31. Id.
32. Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, Legal Affairs
(March/April 2004), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
March-April-2004/story_lessig_marapr04.msp.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Golan, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011). The Court heard Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) between
Eldred and Golan, but this Article does not consider it in this line
of copyright jurisprudence because Grokster was concerned with the
extent of vicarious infringement liability.
36. Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)).
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the URAA gives copyright protection to foreign works
currently in the public domain.37 These foreign works
may be in the public domain because they were never
granted protected status in the first place or because
they were improperly registered or renewed.38
Section 514 of the URAA affected the rights
of many, including Lawrence Golan. Golan was an
orchestra conductor who could not afford music
licensing fees; he could only use works in the public
domain.39 Because section 514 took foreign works out
of the repertoire of music Golan could use, he filed suit
in district court claiming section 514 of the URAA
was unconstitutional.40 The case worked its way up
the federal courts until the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on March 7, 2011.41
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments
on October 5, 2011.42 Anthony Falzone, counsel for
the petitioners, argued that section 514 violated the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.43 Falzone
asserted that while Congress could extend the term
of protection before the protection ends (thanks to
Eldred), Congress could not resurrect that protection
once the endpoint was reached.44 Solicitor General
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. represented the respondent,
arguing that resurrecting protection is a recognized
Congressional right because all works were once in
the public domain before the first copyright statute
removed them from the public domain in 1790.45 He
framed his oral argument around the importance of
international treaties and protecting foreign works
as much as domestic works.46 Justice Alito asked the
Solicitor General whether Congress had the power to
restart protection, and the Solicitor General answered
that the Constitution did not provide an “ironclad
limit” on Congress’ ability to do so.47 In his rebuttal,
Falzone stressed that “limited” in “limited Times”
37. § 514, 108 Stat. at 4976–81.
38. See David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana
Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First
Amendment, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 83, 87 (2011)
(explaining the ways protection may be obtained, despite the Act
excluding works whose protection has expired).
39. Golan, 609 F.3d at 1081–82.
40. Id. at 1082.
41. Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (mem.).
42. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
43. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873
(No. 10–545).
44. Id. at 4.
45. Brief for the Respondent at 11, Golan, 132. S. Ct. 873
(No. 10–545).
46. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 28–29.
47. Id. at 29.
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means having an end to the copyright protection: “[I]f
Congress is forever free to change its mind, then we can
never know if the end has come.”48
III. Analysis of Justices
The Supreme Court might find that section
514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright
Clause.49 Many members of the current Court have
certain predispositions toward copyright protection,
and unfortunately, two of the public domain’s main
supporters—Justice Souter, who wrote the majority
opinion in Acuff-Rose, and Justice Stevens, who
dissented in Eldred—are no longer on the Court.50
The new Court brings with it new biases. If the
Court finds section 514 constitutional, the decision
will be detrimental for numerous reasons. First, it
renders the Constitution’s “limited Times” restriction
meaningless. Second, the decision would chill the
public domain. Finally, it would destroy the safeguards
of the First Amendment. These problems do not end
with Golan; Congress’s interest in the harmonization of
international intellectual property law suggests many
more disputes like this.
The biggest determinant in the Golan outcome
is the legacy of Eldred. Eldred gave Congress a great
deal of discretion in interpreting the Copyright
Clause,51 and all of the justices whose biases are
explored below, with the exception of Justice Breyer,
voted in the majority in Eldred.
Justice Breyer is a supporter of the public
domain. As a Harvard professor, he wrote an article
criticizing copyright protection as unnecessarily long.52
He indicated that copyright holders will always have
a financial interest in extending protection and the
arguments they use are unconvincing.53 For example,
48. Id. at 52–53.
49. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Argument Recap: The
Constitutionality of Zombie Copyrights, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 11,
2011 12:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/argumentrecap-the-constitutionality-of-zombie-copyrights/ (“Falzone took
most of the heat at the argument; petitioners have an uphill battle,
but not necessarily an unwinnable one.”).
50. At the time of this writing, the current justices are: Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas,
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan.
51. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003) (“The
CTEA is a rational exercise of legislative authority conferred by the
Copyright Clause. On this point, the Court defers substantially to
Congress.”).
52. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 281 (1970).
53. Id. at 324.

if copyright protection is to incentivize an author to
sell his book, why should protection last longer than
that author’s lifetime?54 Are we incentivizing him
by the support it may give his great-grandchildren?
Justice Breyer pointed out that only one out of one
hundred books are even in print after fifty-six years.55
Unsurprisingly, he dissented in Eldred and was the
hardest on the Solicitor General during oral arguments
for Golan.56
Some of the public domain’s other defenders
are no longer on the court. Justice Souter wrote
Acuff-Rose’s transformative—in more ways than
one—opinion,57 but he retired in 2009. Justice
Stevens dissented in Eldred,58 but retired last year. His
replacement, Justice Kagan, seems to favorably lean
towards fair use.59 As Justice Marshall’s law clerk,
Kagan advised Justice Marshall to grant certiorari
to a Second Circuit case finding no fair use for J.D.
Salinger’s personal letters used in an unauthorized
biography.60 As the United States Solicitor General,
she recommended that the Supreme Court not hear a
Second Circuit case finding no copyright infringement
in DVR recordings.61 Unfortunately, because Justice
Kagan worked on Golan at the Solicitor General’s office
before her appointment, she recused herself in this
case.62
Interestingly enough, copyright ideologies are
not usually aligned with traditional partisan beliefs.63
There is hope that Justice Alito is also a public domain
54. Id. (acknowledging that it is conceivable that an author
writes for his children’s income, but more probably “authors
discount the value of future income”).
55. Id.
56. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 43, at 34–
36 (asking repeatedly how restoring copyright protection provides
any incentive to create new works).
57. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571
(1994).
58. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
59. James Hirsen, Why Elena Kagan Makes Hollywood Nervous,
Newsmax.com (July 6, 2010 9:26 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/
Hirsen/Elena-Kagan-Hollywood-Supreme/2010/07/06/id/363862.
60. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); see also Jess Bravin,
Kagan’s Brushes with the Boldfaced (While a Supreme Court Clerk),
Wall St. J., June 8, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/08/
kagans-brushes-with-the-boldfaced-while-a-supreme-court-clerk/.
61. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
62. Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (mem.) (stating
that Justice Kagan did not consider the petition for certiorari).
63. Nick Baumann, Hey Kids, Wanna Listen to “Peter and
the Wolf ”? Then Pay Up, Mother Jones (Oct. 6, 2011, 5:45 AM)
(predicting Breyer and Ginsburg as dipoles and Alito, Kennedy, and
Sotomayor as wild cards in the Golan decision).
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defender. As a judge for the Third Circuit, Justice
Alito wrote a Feist-like opinion in Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp.64 The court held that parts numbers
used in captive fasteners did not have the requisite
creativity necessary for copyright protection and must
thus remain in the public domain.65 The opinion is
a thoughtful inspection of originality and, at the very
least, we can expect Justice Alito to give Golan the time
and thought it deserves.66
Though Justice Scalia was in the majority in
Eldred, and Golan is arguably an extension of Eldred,
there are glimmers of hope for Justice Scalia. In Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., a trademark
case, Justice Scalia wrote that authorship claims cannot
be made after a work enters the public domain.67
Hopefully, Scalia will draw the same conclusion for the
authors of foreign works in copyright law.
Some of the justices have not shown a
predisposition either way in copyright law. For
example, Justice Thomas was in the majority for both
Acuff-Rose and Eldred. Unsurprisingly, he did not reveal
any biases—or anything else—during oral argument for
Golan.68
Justice Kennedy gave some illumination into
his copyright ideology in his Acuff-Rose concurrence.
He was concerned with a court’s post-hoc finding of
fair use.69 He reassured the country—or perhaps just
himself—that fair use still had defined “proper limits.”70
Justice Kennedy explained that one of those limits is
to gauge how much of a copyrighted work must be
taken for the particular fair use; for example, if it is a
parody, a great deal must be taken so that the fair user
can evoke the original while also commenting on it.71
Because the nature of the use determines the amount
taken, it is more difficult for a court to presume an
unintended fair use without matching the fair user’s
64. 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
65. Id. at 282.
66. See generally William Patry, Judge Alito and Copyright,
The Patry Copyright Blog (Oct. 31, 2005), http://williampatry.
blogspot.com/2005/10/judge-alito-and-copyright.html.
67. 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (“To hold otherwise would be
akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and
copyright, which Congress may not do.”).
68. See generally Justice Clarence Thomas’s 5-Year Silence: By
the Numbers, The Week (Feb. 16, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://theweek.
com/article/index/212188/justice-clarence-thomass-5-year-silenceby-the-numbers (detailing Justice Thomas’s silence on the bench).
69. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 600
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 599.
71. Id. at 598 (warning that this determination is “by no
means a test of mechanical application”).
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intent with the amount of the copyrighted work
taken.72 Justice Kennedy’s concern for the copyright
holder in Acuff-Rose, especially since he stood alone in
his concurrence and there was no dissent, is worrisome
for the impending Golan decision.
Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court two
years after Eldred, but he argued two intellectual
property cases before the Court prior to joining. In
1998, he argued that his client deserved a jury trial
for statutory damages stemming from copyright
infringement and the Court agreed with him.73 And
in 2001, when he argued a trademark case, the Court
once again agreed with him, holding that his client
could copy an expired patent, despite the trade dress
infringement claim.74 His confirmation process
revealed little about his intellectual property beliefs75
and he is known for his neutral tone during oral
arguments.76 However, he notoriously worried about
Jimi Hendrix’s rendition of the national anthem during
oral arguments for Golan should the Star-Spangled
Banner suddenly retain protected status.77 But for
everything besides his beloved Hendrix, it is unclear
how the Chief Justice will hold.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion
in Eldred and has the strongest ties to a protectionist
agenda. Her daughter is a professor at Columbia
Law School and has numerous publications on the
importance of copyright protection.78 In the oral
arguments for Golan, Justice Ginsburg was the most
aggressive with petitioner’s counsel and nearly silent
during respondent’s argument.79
72. See id. at 598 (emphasizing the importance of the third
factor of the fair use analysis).
73. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340 (1998).
74. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001).
75. Anne Broache, Chief Justice Nominee Carries Slim Record
on Tech, CNET (Sept. 6, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/Chief-justicenominee-carries-slim-record-on-tech/2100-1028_3-5851480.html.
76. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; In the Roberts
Court, There’s More Room for Argument, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2006,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9906E6D6113FF9
30A35756C0A9609C8B63 (“Roberts doesn’t tip his hand as much.
He asks hard questions of both sides without communicating his
own preference.”).
77. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 43, at 40–41.
78. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad
Name For Itself, 26 Colum. J.L. & Arts 61, 62 (2002) (“Worse,
they would decry this enforcement as a threat to the Constitutional
goal of promotion of the Progress of Science, and thus a threat to
the public interest.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the
Future of Copyright, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 381 (2008).
79. E.g., Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 43, at 53–57
(questioning Falzone throughout his rebuttal).
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Justice Ginsburg’s aggression against the
petitioner was echoed by Justice Sotomayor, who
has exhibited protectionist values in the past. As a
litigator in New York, she protected the Fendi brand
from counterfeiters.80 As a judge for the Southern
District of New York, she wrote the opinion for Tasini
v. New York Times, Co., holding that large media
conglomerates have the right to put published works
online.81 This was much to the chagrin of the freelance
journalists who thought they agreed only to written
publication. The Supreme Court later reversed.82
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion could point to a fair use
perspective—the media companies are rightly using
journalists’ work—but the fear is that her loyalties lie
with the large rights holders, like the MPAA and the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
rather than those who employ the fair use doctrine.83
At the Supreme Court level, Tasini is again a reminder
of where the copyright biases diverge: Justice Ginsburg
wrote the majority opinion, focusing on journalists’
right to protect their work, and Justice Breyer and
Justices Stevens were the only dissenters.84
In many ways, Golan repeats the themes of
Eldred and only one of Eldred’s dissenters—Justice
Breyer—is still on the Court. And while Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Sotomayor offer new voices, the
prognosis does not seem favorable. If the dangers of
Eldred continue, will “limited Times” have any meaning
left?
IV. How the Supreme Court Should Hold
Congress does not have the option of omitting
“limited” from “limited Times” in the Copyright
Clause. The Solicitor General in Golan argues that
“limited” only means that Congress does not have the
power to grant perpetual copyrights.85 This reading
would render the rest of the clause meaningless;86
80. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer
and a Dreamer, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2009, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.
html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
81. See 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
82. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
83. See John Herrman, Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee
Knows Stuff About Computers, Gizmodo (May 27, 2009, 11:00
AM), http://gizmodo.com/5271318/obamas-supreme-courtnominee-knows-stuff-about-computers (predicting that Sotomayor
will hold for MPAA or RIAA if the Court hears any file-sharing
cases).
84. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 45, at 13.
86. Clearly the limited times restriction has meaning since
patent and copyright have two very different terms of protection.

there is no balance if works never enter the public
domain and enrich society.87 In the Supreme Court’s
first discussion of limited times, Justice Story stated
that the purpose was to “admit the people at large,
after a short interval, to the full possession and
enjoyment of all writings and inventions without
restraint.”88 And yet, when the CTEA was discussed
on the House floor, Representative Mary Bono Mack
stated that her husband—whom the law is nicknamed
after—“understood the delicate balance of the
constitutional interests at stake,” and yet “wanted the
term of copyright protection to last forever.”89 Clearly,
there was a disconnect in Sonny Bono’s thinking.
Representative Mack then suggested the term proposed
by the MPAA president Jack Valenti: forever minus one
day.90 This proposal is the equivalent of a perpetual
copyright,91 and the fact that the MPAA’s lobbying
efforts would reach this far—and that a representative
would be so skewed to one side—confirms that only
the Supreme Court can fix the constitutional violations
that Congress accepts.
Eldred allows Congress to continually extend
the length of copyright protection, but Golan adds
a new snag: when the copyright protection ends,
Congress can resurrect it again. “[L]imited Times” is
now the “limited and limited again times.” In the past,
the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this “species
of perpetual patent and copyright.”92 The Court cannot
waive this constitutional requirement just for admission
into international intellectual property treaties.
The most persuasive rationale that Petitioner
argues is the chilling effect on free expression.93 When
works enter the public domain, anyone may use,
enhance, or modify them. People may also create
businesses around these works, investing time and
resources into the new expression.94 If there is a danger
87. Walterscheid, supra note 27, at 271. Patent protection
lasts only twenty years.
88. Id. at 274.
89. 144 Cong. Rec. 9951–52 (1998), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-1007-pt1-PgH9946.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Forever is not a definite number, so forever minus any
definite number is still forever. The MPAA chairman’s proposal
is still unconstitutional. See Is There Really Such Thing as Infinity?
University of Toronto Mathematics Network, http://www.
math.toronto.edu/mathnet/answers/infinity.html (last visited Dec.
15, 2011).
92. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539
U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
93. Brief of Petitioner at 45, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No.
10–545).
94. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade
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that these works will return to protected status at the
whim of Congress, people will not invest time and
resources and expression will be stifled. Even if the
individual is almost certain that his use is a fair use, the
individual might still be hindered by just the potential
for liability.95
When people are hindered from using works in
the public domain to create new expressions, their right
to free speech is also impacted. Even Justice Ginsburg
admits in Eldred that the guarantees of a public domain
and fair use are the First Amendment’s safety valves
within the Copyright Clause.96 And yet those safety
valves are destroyed when Congress expands copyright
protection to the detriment of the public domain.
The current Court, tethered to the Eldred decision
and influenced by individual biases, may fail the
Constitution in Golan.
This problem does not end with Golan either.
In oral arguments for Golan, the justices tried to rein
in the petitioners by asking that they focus on the
particular situation of resurrected copyright protection
being litigated rather than sliding into hypothetical
arguments of Shakespeare regaining copyright
protection.97 This slippery slope argument is not
unfounded though. Harmonization in international
intellectual property law is very important right
now.98 However, other countries do not have the
same Constitution or Copyright Clause. So, when
the United States signs international treaties with
countries that have very different laws than our own,
we risk violating our own laws. The copyright—
and other intellectual property—issues arising from
harmonization may not end with Golan and the
Supreme Court cannot ignore the dangers of too much
copyright protection as Congress signs treaty after
treaty.
V. Retrospective
The Supreme Court handed down the Golan
decision on January 18, 2012, holding that section 514
of the URAA was constitutional because neither the
Policy: Understanding the Golan Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34
Colum. J.L. & Arts 131, 138–139 (2011).
95. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30
Colum. J.L. & Arts 429, 429 (2006-2007) (listing the ways fair
users are “chilled”).
96. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217-21 (2003).
97. See e.g., Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 43, at 8–9
(cutting off Falzone when he began to discuss resurrecting Ben
Johnson and Alexis de Tocqueville for copyright protection).
98. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(attempting to harmonize international patent law).
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Copyright Clause nor the First Amendment “makes
the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory that
works may never exit.”99 Rather than focusing on the
goal of the Copyright Clause—balancing protection
with public dissemination—the Court looked narrowly
at the language of section 514. There is nothing
explicit in the Constitution that says works may not be
taken out of the public domain.
Justice Ginsburg, the most protectionistleaning of the justices, wrote the opinion.100 As
predicted, she was joined by Justice Kennedy and
Justice Sotomayor. Any glimmer of hope for Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia was quickly
extinguished; they, along with Justice Thomas, rounded
out the majority.101 Unsurprisingly, Justice Breyer
wrote an impassioned dissent.102 He stressed that the
Copyright Clause is supposed to encourage the creation
of works, and section 514 of the URAA increases
protection and restarts protection for already created
works; the statute does not incentivize anyone to create
something new.103 Justice Alito—who protected the
public domain in Southco—joined Justice Breyer in the
dissent.104
This Article predicted three consequences that
would result from this decision: (1) the Constitution’s
“limited Times” would be rendered meaningless;
(2) the use of works in the public domain would be
slowed or stopped; and (3) the safeguards of the First
Amendment within the Copyright Clause would be
destroyed. It is too soon to know the chilling effect on
the public domain, but the first and third predictions
came true. With Golan, the Court effectively
foreclosed the constitutional avenues of protecting the
public domain.105 The Court took the constitutional
language at face value—“limited” means anything less
than unlimited—rather than reading the Copyright
Clause for the balance it created between protection
and dissemination.106 The Court found no First
99. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012).
100. Id. at 877 (Ginsburg, J.).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 900.
104. Id. at 899.
105. See Gard, supra note 94, at 192 (“We had been on the
path of a constitutionally protected public domain. Now, trade law
has blindly trumped copyright tradition.”).
106. See Email from Peter Jaszi, Professor, American
University Washington College of Law, to author (Mar. 9, 2012)
(on file with author) (“[the decision] makes it a lot harder for public
interest advocates to argue, with a straight face, that proposed
legislation should be rejected because it isn’t true to the spirit of Art.
I, sec. 8, cl. 8.”).
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Amendment violation when Congress took works out
of the public domain.107 For all intents and purposes,
these constitutional arguments are closed.
The Supreme Court has failed the public
domain, but all is not lost.108 In January 2012, the
American people were able to send a bigger message to
Congress than ever before. The Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA) aimed to prevent websites from linking to or
conducting business with websites that sell infringing
items.109 Many viewed the bill as the Government
having too much control over the Internet; in response
to SOPA—and aided by websites like Wikipedia
and Reddit— millions of people signed petitions,
boycotted the SOPA’s advocates, and contacted their
representatives to oppose the bill.110 This public
outrage was an extremely effective way to direct
Congress; the bill was shelved almost immediately.111
If public domain advocates can channel this
kind of public outrage against Congressional attempts
to expand copyright protection, the result would be far
more immediate than waiting for the Supreme Court to
realize the error of its ways. Congress cannot avoid the
voices of millions, especially since social media websites
give those voices megaphones.112 But it is not just sheer
numbers of supporters, it is money too that influences
the future of copyright protection. In the past, the
more powerful entities—MPAA, RIAA, to name a
few—were on the side of copyright protection. Now,
there are large companies like Google and Wikipedia
that are invested in the public domain and the free
flow of information on the Internet.113 When these
107. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
108. C.f. Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That – A Reluctant (and
Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse
of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 595
(1996) (predicting over a decade ago that constitutional arguments
might fail and public domain advocates need to find other routes).
109. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
110. Jenna Wortham, Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills
Began as Grass-Roots Grumbling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/public-outcry-overantipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.html?_r=1&pagewa
nted=1&ref=technology.
111. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress
Shelves Antipiracy Bills, NY Times, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.
html.
112. Stop SOPA: How People and Social Media Changed
Lawmakers’ Minds, Huffington Post (Jan. 20, 2012 5:12 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/20/stop-sopa-congresschanged-their-mind-on-sopa_n_1219759.html (tracking mentions
of SOPA on Twitter).
113. See, e.g., End Piracy, Not Liberty, Google, https://www.
google.com/landing/takeaction/ (expressing gratitude for SOPA’s
defeat and remaining committed to “our industry’s track record of

companies combine with millions of American citizens
on social media websites, the public domain does not
need the Supreme Court to save it.

innovation and job creation.”).
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